ays that territorial aggression is no longer primary incentive for great powers. Instead, "the route to prestige, power, and economic success in the modern era lies in high technology production and human capital." (Nye, 590) He points out the only rare occasion of a state seizing territory for economic and military purchases is the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Nye notes that it is greatly overstated when Liberals argue that economic power has replaced military power. Instead, he (much like Realists) believes "economic instruments still cannot compare with military forces in their coercive and deterrent effects." (Nye, 589) He uses Iraqi invasion of Kuwait example to show how economic sanctions proved ineffective. The great powers of China and Russia are discussed as potential threats to international interest. Nye considers the two powers in realist and liberal views most difficult to predict. However, China and Russia powers are said to be concerned with domestic political and economic situations and less involved with "throwing their weight around the globe in ways that would only cause neighbors to band together against them." (Nye, 592) The ideal of direct great power conflict is very unlikely because of the strong counterbalancing combination of democratic great powers, nuclear deterrence, and the limited benefits of territorial conquest.
             Regional conflicts are more likely to arise and stir up tension. In particular, Nye mentions three states with the capabilities to upset regional power balances and they are North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. But Nye notes that the U.S. has proven to have ample forces to respond to these contingencies: "Sizing the force to two major regional conflicts (MRCs) at the same time ensures that the U.S. has sufficient capability to deal with the residual risk of great conflicts." (Nye, 596) The real and prevalent threat is communal conflicts. ...